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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of guilty dated March 11, 
1996, entered by Judge Joseph I. Dimick in the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Utah County, Orem Department. Jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
is pursuant to Section 78-2(a)-3(2)(d) and (f), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the City of Orem 
overcame Defendant's affirmative defense of compulsion, due to the 
threats made against her and her family. 
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STATUTES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE 
Section 76-2-302, U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
Section 76-6-602(1), U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The City alleges that the Defendant committed the crime of 
retail theft on December 19, 1995, at approximately 7:45 p.m. 
At trial, the prosecution's witnesses identified the 
Defendant as the person seen removing items from the store shelves 
and concealing them in her coat and bags. 
The Defendant testified that the reason for doing this was 
that, upon her entering the store, a man put a knife at her back 
and told her to keep on walking naturally, and that if she did not 
follow through with his instructions, her family would be injured. 
Defendant testified further that this man had taken her 
purse, and did have her identification to track her down. Because 
of her fear of what would happen to her or her family, Defendant 
admitted that she did in fact take numerous items without intending 
to pay for them. 
The trial court found that the Defendant's testimony was not 
credible, because the officer testified that her purse, with 
identification intact, was listed on the property sheet filled out 
at booking. In addition, the Court accepted the testimony of the 
officer that Defendant had her purse, with identification, at the 
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time of her arrest. 
The Court then found that it was incredible to believe that 
Defendant would be afraid of a stranger at the time of the 
incident, and not report the incident when first questioned, but 
not be afraid to testify about the incident at trial. The Court 
found the Defendant guilty of the crime of retail theft and entered 
judgment against her on March 11, 1996. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court found Defendant guilty based on the fact that 
Defendant failed to notify any security personnel of her 
predicament at the time she was stopped. However, Defendant 
claimed at trial that she did notify a security guard, but was 
unable to identify who he was, and was therefore unable to subpoena 
him as a witness. However, only by completely disregarding 
Defendant's testimony could the Circuit Court have found Defendant 
guilty. 
POINT I 
WHEN A DEFENDANT IS COMPELLED TO COMMIT A CRIME BY 
ANOTHER THROUGH THREATS, THE DEFENDANT HAS ESTABLISHED AN 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO THE CHARGE. 
Utah provides by statute that a defendant who is charged with 
a crime may raise an affirmative defense to that charge if the 
defendant was compelled to commit the crime through threats of harm 
to the defendant or others. §76-2-306 U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
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At trial, Defendant testified that she did in fact remove numerous 
fromthe store shelves and attempt to leave without paying for them. 
(Tr. 15). The Defendant then testified in some detail about a 
heavyset man cut the straps to her purse and then threatened to 
harm her and her family if she did not steal various items for him. 
(Tr. 15-17). In addition, Defendant's father testified that a 
security guard asked him (the father) had witnessed he had 
witnessed a man threatening his daughter. (Tr. 23). Officer Moake 
later testified that he booked Defendant's purse with her other 
property, but did not show any booking sheet to substantiate his 
memory. (Tr. 25). 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously ruled on the standard of 
proof required once an affirmative defense is raised. In State v. 
Hill, the Supreme Court stated "It is fundamental that the State 
carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each 
element of an offense, including the absence of an affirmative once 
the defense is put into issue." State v. Hill, 727 P. 2d 221, 222 
(Utah 1986). In the present case, Defendant raised the affirmative 
defense of justification, because of compulsion. The only evidence 
the City of Orem presented to rebutted Defendant's tesimony, and 
that of her father, was the unsubstantiated assertion of Officer 
Moake that he did book into property Defendant's purse. This is 
not proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's claim of 
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compulsion was not true. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also provided the standard of proof 
necessary when an affirmative defense is alleged, and only rebutted 
by circumstantial evidence. The Court stated "Where the only 
evidence presented against the defendant is circumstantial, the 
evidence supporting conviction must preclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence." State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 
1986). The Plaintiff has not overcome this burden, by proving that 
Defendant's defense was unreasonable. There is little evidence to 
refute Defendant's version of what happened, and the testimony of 
her father, and the City has the obligation of showing that there 
is only one version of the facts that is reasonable. 
There was substantial evidence that Defendant committed the 
crime of retail theft, but that it was done under duress. Both 
Defendant and her father testified that they spoke to a security 
guard about the incident. The only evidence to rebut Defendant's 
testimony was Officer Moake's unsubstantiated testimony that he had 
booked Defendant's purse into the jail with Defendant's other 
property. 
POINT II 
WAS THE TRIAL COURT CORRECT IN DISCOUNTING COMPLETELY THE 
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT AND HER FATHER? 
The Court of Appeals views the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the trial court, meaning that there is a presumption 
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that the trial court's decision was correct. However, when the 
evidence does not support the decision of the trial court, this 
Court can, and should, overturn the decision of the trial court. 
As shown above, there is no direct evidence contradicting 
Defendant's version of the facts. Only by completely discounting 
Defendant's and her father's testimony could the trial court have 
found guilty. As discussed above, Defendant does not believe that 
Plaintiff met the burden of showing that her version of what 
happened could not reasonably have happened. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above points, Defendant that it is clear that the 
City did not meet its burden of proving that her version of the 
facts was unreasonable, and that the decision of the lower court 
should be overturned and Defendant granted a new trial. 
DATED the fff day of August, 1996. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
Randy M. Lish 
Attorney for Defendant 
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